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I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Employer/Surety ("Employer") does not viably dispute the accuracy of the Statement of
Facts contained in Jordan's Opening Brief.

Moreover, Employer failed to negate such

unrebutted and cited facts. Likewise, Employer completely failed to repudiate the controlling
judicial and statutory law cited and relied upon by Jordan throughout his Opening Brief.
Unfortunately, Employer purports to present appellate arguments/assertions premised
largely on, supposition, revisionist history, arbitrary action and selective omissions. Similarly,
the Response reveals that rather than reference or even acknowledge controlling legal authority,
Employer merely opts to equivocate or outright ignore such prevailing judicial strictures as set
forth by the Supreme Court of Idaho. This strategy exposes the underlying, fundamental factual
as well as insunnountable legal deficiencies integral to Employer's positions, while
simultaneously demonstrating a synchronicity with the problematic administrative practices
employed by Referee Marsters and ultimately the Industrial Commission through its April 13,
2015, Findings, Conclusions and Order.
By way of example, in its "Statement of the Case," Employer asserts:
Claimant's treating physician released him from care in March 2010, noting that
Claimant was asymptomatic, tolerating full and nonnal activities, including work
and that Claimant did not request additional evaluation.
Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief~ pg. 2 (emphasis added). As indicated by the fact that
Employer failed to provide any supporting citation, there is no evidence in record documenting
that Dr. Heiner, the "treating physician," directly provided any such "release," nor made the
purported "notations" in March of 2010.
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Quite to the contrary, the actual evidence reveals that

Dr. Heiner's one and only involvement in Jordan's treatment transpired on the isolated date of
February 16, 2010, wherein he contemplated a "probable phone discharge" and erroneously
advised "The patient was counseled that the pain does not indicate any significant pathology and
should resolve gradually over time ... " Hr'g Ex. G, pg. 157. Simply stated, the medical records
determinatively prove that this defense assertion is a fiction.
Astoundingly, Employer implicitly acknowledged the contrived nature of its proposition,
in later inconsistently avowing:
A few weeks later on March 22, 2010 a physician's assistant from the clinic
telephoned Claimant to see how he was doing. After speaking to him, the PA
reported that he was doing his norn1al activity, including normal work, that he
was asymptomatic and did not require furiher treatment.
See, Respondents' I 0/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 9 (underline original) (emphasis added). This is

merely a recitation of Employer's inaccurate averrnents made to the Industrial Commission 1•
Jordan directly addressed the factual and legal fallacies of these assertions, setting forth:
An objective review of this "check-the-box" fonn does not reveal any fom1 of
direct contact, telephonically or otherwise, between a "physician's assistant" and
Claimant on that date and most significantly, does not even include any actual
medical opinions. Specifically, this forn1 contains two distinct signatures and the
one under the "check-the-box" entries is wholly devoid of any professional
medical designation. Moreover, the second bottom signature designated as a
"PA-C/NP" does not document any kind of direct interaction with Claimant, but
rather merely ascribes having "reviewed the medical file and concur with the
medical discharge." See, Exhibit G, pg. 160 ( emphasis added). More than likely,
this "check-the-box" fonn was nothing more than a routine administrative closure
of Claimant's case per the "phone discharge" instructions specifically set forth by
Dr. Heiner on February 16, 2010, and conspicuously does not account for the fact
that Dr. Heiner specifically infonned Claimant that his herniated disc pathology
few weeks later on March 22, 20 IO a physician's assistant from the clinic telephoned Claimant to see how
he was doing. After speaking with him, the PA reported ... " See, Defs' 1/13/15 Post-Hr'g Response Brief, pg. 8
(emphasis added).
1 "A
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was insignificant, or that Dr. Heiner injected the site with lidocainc. See, Exhibit
G, pg. 157. In any event, such postulation is undoubtedly the reason that the
Commission ascribes "minimal weight" to "check-the-box" fonns, especially
when "without explanation of how the physician reached the conclusion ... the
fact finder has no way of knowing what facts the doctor relied upon in fonning
his or her opinions, and the medical relevance of those facts." Willford v. 11ie
Rooter Guys, 2010 IIC 0044.1, 0044.11 (2010).
Clmt's 2/3/15 Post-Hr'g Reply Brief: pgs. 5-6.

Remarkably, the Commission's holdings in

Wil(ford are a direct reflection of the Comi's prior rnling that even with explanatory medical
testimony:
[T]hey were most likely filled out by a billing clerk, and thus had no bearing on
his medical diagnosis, but were rather related to billing purposes. Therefore, the
checked boxes on these forms are not evidence that a reasonable mind would
use to support a conclusion ... Because of the ambi 6:ruity inherent ... this fon11
cannot be considered evidence that [the treating physicians] believed [the injured
worker's] injury was not work related.
Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch C01p., 145 Idaho 325, 333-334, 179 P.3d 288 (2008). Distinct from
Stevens-McAtee, Employer did not provide any explanatory evidence whatsoever to reveal the
purpose or medical implications, if any, of the March 22, 2010, "check-the-box" form, nor even
the identity or professional designation, of all the individual(s) that initialed the fon11.
Significantly, Employer failed to avail itself of the opportunities provided through crossexamination to adduce testimony directly from Jordan that any such telephone contact even
transpired on March 22, 2010.

As a matter of practicality, without such clarification and

identification, subjective "interpretation" of this ambiguous office fon11 is an exercise in pure
speculation. As such, per the Court's ruling in Stevens-McAtee, the March 22, 2010, "check-
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the-box" office fonn ts "not evidence a reasonable mind would use to support" a medical
conclusion.
Notably, as in numerous other instances, Employer failed to directly address the actual
facts and controlling law related to the veracity of its reliance upon such "check-the-box" office
fom1, instead resorting to wholly unsubstantiated avennents that Jordan's reliance upon the
treating physician's actual medical records and his legible narrative contained therein, somehow
constitutes an "entirely misleading" omission. Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 20
n2.

Evidently, the best that Employer can muster, is to criticize Jordan's reliance on the

decipherable medical records/na1Tative actually generated by the doctor, per the Court's
controlling edicts, rather than Employer's legally e1Toneous subjective interpretation of a
completely ambiguous office "check-the-box" fonn.

To that end, any "entirely misleading"

accusations by Employer are ill-infom1ed and, are, at best, disingenuous.

Additionally, this

dubious defense strategy mimics the Commission's deliberative administrative methodology of
refusing to abide by the Court's clear mandates with respect to the weight, or lack thereof,
afforded to certain types of evidence.
With respect to "misleading omissions," Employer asserts that Jordan "worked for
approximately a year and a half without need for any medical treatment relating to his neck.
(Tr. pg. 91 )" Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 9 ( emphasis added). Contrary to this
Employer avowal, a review of page 91 of the Hearing Transcript establishes that no such
testimony exists. Rather the facts in evidence reveal the actual exchange as:
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Q. Now, from that point when your treatment is concluded in February of 2010
up until the following summer of 2011, you didn't have any treatment for your
neck; correct?
A. That's correct. I did not.
(Tr., p. 91, LL 20-24) (emphasis added).
91.

The tenn "need" does not appear anywhere on page

In any event, the "need" for, and actual receipt of medical treatment are obviously two

distinct concepts. Again, such strained extrapolations seems to be the best that Employer can
conjure to deflect the overwhelming and unrcbutted medical evidence/opinions from Drs. Foutz,
Doerr and Verska, that as a direct result of the subject January 12, 2010, accepted work-related
accident and injuries, Jordan did, in fact, "need" neck treatment, up to, and including a cervical
fusion surgery. As with the Industrial Commission, Employer's reliance upon, or espousal of
non-existent testimony is, at best, questionable and clearly contravenes controlling law. The
Court was unequivocal in admonishing 'Just as fundamental, however, is the principle that

factfinding in contested cases is governed exclusively by the record of the hearing.' Mazzone

v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,761,302 P.3d 718 (2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
In keeping with "misleading omissions," given that it cannot rebut Dr. Foutz's
testimony2, Employer, in an apparent attempt to somehow undennine Dr. Foutz and Dr. Doerr,

I

With respect to conspicuous "omissions," throughout its "Statement of Facts," Respondents failed to disclose or
even acknowledge Dr. Foutz's recorded testimony, which it adduced by taking the Doctor's pre-hearing deposition.
Notably, in implicitly recognizing the absolutely devastating effect that Dr. Foutz's unrebutted testimony has upon
Respondents' unsubstantiated positions, it does not appear that Respondents cited to the Doctor's deposition
testimony even once throughout their entire Response Brief.

2
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inexplicably repeats 3 the asse1tion that "Claimant got in to see Dr. Timothy Doerr of Orthopedic
Associates on August 18, 2011. Although he had been referred for his knee, when he saw Dr.
DoeiT his primary complaint was his neck symptoms ... " Respondents' 10/ 10/15 Response
Brief, pg. 10.

As a matter of reality, Employer is fully aware of the inaccuracy of such a

contention, in that it directly addressed this issue with Dr. Foutz, wherein the Doctor
unequivocally testified:

Q. Or is it possible you were referring him to that office for his knee?
A. The primary referral, initially, was for his knee and for -- to review spine
symptoms. The primary refeITal referral -Q. But at that time for his low back, right?
A. Well, there's actually a telephone note related to that which indicates both
the cervical spine and low back after review of the imaging.
(Dr. Foutz Depo Tr., p. 38, LI. 23-25) ( emphasis added).

The affected nature of this contention

is further negated by Dr. DoeJT's August 18, 2011, responsive referral correspcmdence to Dr.
Foutz, therein setting forth in pertinent pa1t, "Thank you for the kind referral of Edward

Jordan. I had the pleasure of seeing your patient ... on August 18, 2011 for axial neck pain
and bilateral knee pain." Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 50 (emphasis added). As previously briefed, this
Employer tactic is a not so subtle variant of the Commission's "rationalization" to arbitrarily
ignore Dr. Foutz's unrebutted testimonial clarification/explanation of his own medical records
and Jordan's cervical symptom history, in favor of a subjective, prejudicial interpretation,

'"It is clear from the records of Dr. Foutz that the referral for orthopedic consultation had nothing to do with
Claimant's neck ... " See, Defs' 1/13/15 Post-Hr'g Response Brief, pg. 10 (emphasis added).

I
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thereby directly violating clear mandates set fo1ih by the Comi. Stevens-McAtee, 145 Idaho at
336.
In what can only be described as a wholly revisionist "interpretation" of the evidentiary
record, Employer dubiously proclaims 4 "[W]hile Dr. Doerr was attempting to get the surety for
the 2006 claim to auth01ize his proposed surgery, Claimant was attempting to convince the VA
that his neck problems were service related."

Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 12.

As in too many other instances, the evidence of record establishes that Employer is well aware of
the actual facts, in that they specifically addressed this precise issue during the July 18, 2013,
hearing, to which Jordan provided unrebutted testimony:

Q. All right. Well, whether you asked Dr. Foutz for this or not, did you make a
claim for the VA your you're neck problems were service related?
A. My neck problems went in with my claim, as did all the problems I was
having, and while I was at the VA numerous time I told them it was a work-

related incident.
(Tr., p. 99, LL 12-17) (emphasis added). The veracity of Jordan's testimony is corroborated
through the actual VA records which unambiguously provide:
Dr. Doerr has recommended an anterior cervical decompression and fusion of C46 and veteran says he tentatively has set this up for June 6, 2012. He is still
working on whether his insurance will cover it temporarily until his lawyers can
get the Workman's Comp (or Occupational medicine) insurance to cover it since
he feels this is a work related injury.
Hr' g Ex. K, pg. 272 (emphasis added).

Again, this fallacious assertion by Employer seems to

mimic the Commission's policies of making factual proclamations which do not actually exist, or

Respondents proffered the same unsubstantiated assertion to the Industrial Commission. See, Defs' 1/13/15 PostHr'g Response Brief, pg. 12, see also, Clmt's 2/3/15 Post-Hr'g Reply Brief, pg. 4.

4
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otherwise patently misstate the objective evidence in record. Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse,
Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 761 ("[A]n agency may not use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for

evidence presented at hearing.").
Unfortunately, throughout the remainder of its Response Brief, Employer, in large part,
fails or otherwise refuses to directly address Jordan's legal-based appellate arguments. Rather,
similar to the Industrial Commission's deliberative practice, Employer's briefing seemingly
constitutes a dodge of the actual evidence in record and applicable controlling law. Regrettably,
as with the underlying administrative proceedings, Employer appears to do little more than
proffer

an

invitation to

contemporaneously

capriciously discount

1gnonng

the

controlling

the unrebutted

judicial/legal

factual

constraints

record,
oveniding

while
the

Commission's deliberative process, in favor of arbitrary administrative action to the complete
prejudice of an injured worker.
11.

ARGUMENT and AUTHORITY

The Court will not consider appeal issues which are not supported by propositions of
law, authority, or argument. Langley v. State, 126 Idaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). "A
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both
are lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P .2d 966 (1996) (emphasis added).

The

provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed "in favor of the
employees in order to serve the humane purposes for which it was promulgated." Wernecke v.
St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009) (citations omitted).

"Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured." Combs v.
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Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695,698,769 P.2d 572 (1989) (citation omitted).

"Workmen's

compensation cases, because of their medical aspects, depend upon knowledge neither

expected nor possessed by lay witnesses, and the basis for any award must rest upon and be
supported by medical testimony." Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 163, 997 P.2d 621
(2000) ( citation omitted) ( emphasis added).

"A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firn1 conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948) (emphasis added).

A.

The Industrial Commission's Credibilitv and Medical Causation
Findings/Conclusions are Not Supported by Substantial and Competent
Evidence and Do Not Comport with Controlling Law.

The overwhelming preponderance of objective, reliable, and corroborated evidence
proves that Jordan's accepted January 12, 2010, work-related accident resulted in extensive
cervical injuries necessitating the June 6, 2012, tri-level decompression and fusion surgery
performed by Dr. Doe1T.

With respect to Industrial Commission proceedings, it is a

"fundamental . . . principle that fact finding in contested cases is governed exclusively by the

record of the hearing." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,761,302 P.3d 718
(2013) ( citation omitted) ( emphasis added).

"[T]he referee is charged with taking an

independent role as an adjudicator, must listen to the testimony of experts, and must render an
impartial decision based upon the evidence in the record and the law ... " Mazzone v. Texas

Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho at 761 ( emphasis added). "An agency that uses its specialized
knowledge as a substitute for evidence will not have it order sustained." 154 Idaho at 761-62
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( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). "[A]n order of the Commission must be set aside where
the law is misapplied to the evidence." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 697, 769 P.2d
572 (1989). As is systemic throughout, Employer failed to present "substantial and competent
evidence" arguments premised upon the application of controlling law to the objective,
unrebutted evidence in this case.
Co1Tespondingly, Employer failed to directly address Jordan's factually and legally based
arguments. Notably, Employer failed to dispute:

I

•

That as a matter of law, Jordan is "observationally" credible;

•

That Jordan's hearing testimony was consistent with that provided during his July 24,
2012, deposition;

•

That as a means to discredit Jordan, Referee Marsters and ultimately the Industrial
Commission attributed testimony to Jordan which does not exist in the evidentiary
record;

•

That as a means to discredit Jordan and Dr. Foutz, Referee Marsters and ultimately
the Industrial Commission relied upon an exhibit ("telephone message from July 26,
2011 ") which does not exist in the evidentiary record;

•

That as a means to discredit and "undiagnosed" Dr. Foutz, Referee Marsters and
ultimately the Industrial Commission substituted 5 its own diagnosis/interpretation of
Dr. Foutz's medical records, rather than act in accord with controlling law and accept
Dr. Foutz's testimonial clarification/explanation thereof;

•

That Dr. Foutz provided unrebutted testimony, in his capacity as Jordan's Board
Certified personal physician, corroborating Jordan's presentation of medical evidence
and cervical symptom history;

5 "When

a finder of fact exceeds this role and engages in medical diagnosis, this Court loses confidence that the
Commission's referee is not rejecting or discounting admissible and competent evidence offered by the claimant
based merely on the referee's own unqualified medical opinions." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, btc., 154 ldaho at
761.
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•

That as a means to discredit Jordan and Dr. Doerr, the Industrial Commission devised
a chronology for disclosure of the undisputed January 12, 2010, accident and injuries,
which is directly contradicted by the actual evidence in record;

•

That it was clearly enoneous and contrary to controlling legal authority for Referee
Marsters and ultimately the Industrial Commission to utilize credibility findings as a
means to summarily ignore or otherwise discount the unrebutted opinions of Dr.
Doerr and Dr. Verska; and

•

That the Stevens-McAtee, and Vawter decisions constitute controlling and persuasive
authority in this case; and

Despite the foregoing, Employer proclaims, again without citation, that "This appeal does not
raise any legal issues ... " and "No error is asse1ied with regard to the conduct of the Industrial
Commission hearing process." Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pgs. 10 and 29. Even a
succinct review of Jordan's appellate briefing to the Comi demonstrates the patent farcicality of
this asse1iion.
Astonishingly, in contravention of the objective hearing record, Employer erroneously
proclaims "The Commission had before it and considered all of the documentary evidence and
otherwise that had been submitted by Claimant." Id. at pg. 10. In addition to the foregoing, the
actual hearing record establishes quite the opposite. Specifically, following the July 18, 2013,
hearing, Referee Marsters left the record open for the submission of supplemental exhibits by
both Parties.

Subsequently, on September 17, 2013, Referee Marsters issued an "Order

Confinning Admission of Items Into Evidence," therein settling Employer's Exhibit Nos. 1
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3,

along with Jordan's supplemental Exhibits Y 6 and Z 7 into evidence. See, Appellant's October
20, 2015, Motion and Statement to Augment Agency Record.
For reasons unknown, the record reveals that when it came time for administrative
deliberation, Referee Marsters and ultimately the Industrial Commission failed to identify,
consider and incorporate all of Jordan's Exhibits.

Demonstrably, under the "Evidence

Considered" heading of their respective decisions, both Referee Marsters and the Industrial
Commission completely failed to list Jordan's Exhibits Y and Z. R., pg. 4; Referee's 3/18/15
Findings & Recommendations, pg. 4. Moreover, neither Referee Marsters nor the Industrial
Commission cited to Jordan's Exhibits Y and Zin their respective decisions. Contrastingly, both
Referee Marsters and the Industrial Commission listed Employer's Exhibit Nos. 1-3 as "admitted
at and following the hearing" and actually extended the courtesy of considering and citing to
Employer's Exhibits. R., pgs. 4 and 21; Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pgs. 4
and 22. The Court has had occasion to reject similar arbitrary administrative exclusions, ruling:
From the record before us we are constrained to view the claimant's evidence
having been fully presented, the denial of the defendants of the right to be
heard was a denial of due process.

Duggan v. Potlach Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 264, 441 P .2d 172 (1968) ( emphasis added).
Furthennore, such a discemable administrative exclusion, necessarily establishes that contrary to
judicial dictates, Referee Marsters and the Commission deprived Jordan of an "impartial decision
based upon the evidence in record and the law ... " Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154

6

7

Jordan's service-related medical records.
Jordan's service-related persom1el records.
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Idaho at 761. As such, the Industrial Commission's April 13, 2015, Decision and Order are not
premised upon substantial and competent evidence and do not comport with controlling law.
As an apparent alternative attempt to somehow construct support for the Commission's
extensively flawed decision, Employer deelares, despite the objective evidence in record, "the
Court need look no further than the repo1is and testimony of Dr. Robert Friedman."
Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 20.

Such a pica epitomizes the insunnountable

factual and legal deficiencies integral to both the Employer's contentions and the Commission's
administrative deliberative process.
Initially, with respect to controlling legal dictates, the Comi has been unequivocal in
pronouncing that review of the Commission's administrative actions and conclusions must be
premised upon the "totality of the foregoing evidence" and/or the employment of "a totality of
the circumstances approach." Evans v. Hara's Inc., 123 Idaho 473,479, 898 P.2d 934 (1993);
Chavez v. Stokes,

Idaho_, 335 P.3d 414, 418 (2015). It would seem that Employer's

request for the Court to effectively don blinders and arbitrarily choose the incomplete,
uninfonned and derivative opinions of a non-specialist physiatrist does not comport with the
controlling "totality of the evidence/circumstances" deliberative strictures.
Additionally, in relation to evidence actually in record, Employer does not, and as a
matter of practicality cannot, dispute:
•

That Dr. Friedman is not a cervical spme specialist and 1s otherwise not Board
Certified in orthopedic surgery;

•

That Dr. Friedman actually refers patients with Jordan's cervical conditions to
orthopedic surgeons such as Dr. Doen;
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•

That unlike Dr. Verska, Dr. Friedman's practice 1s not dedicated solely to spme
treatment;

"

That unlike Dr. Verska, Dr. Friedman has not treated thousands of patients with
cervical conditions like Jordan, nor perfonned hundreds of C4-7 surgeries;

•

That Dr. Doerr was the only doctor in this case presented with the opp01iunity to
personally visualize and assess Jordan's affected cervical spine through actually
perfonning the subject June 6, 2012, C4-7 anterior cervical decompression and
fusion;

o

That Dr. Friedman was not provided with, nor did he personally review any of
Jordan's 2010 treatment records when he generated his December 22, 2011, IME
report;

•

That Dr. Friedman did not have all of the medical records and diagnostic imaging
available to, and reviewed by, Ors. Doerr and Verska;

•

That Dr. Friedman did not perfonn a comprehensive review of Dr. Doerr's surgical
report;

•

That unlike Ors. Doerr and Verska, Dr. Friedman was not provided with, nor did he
ever personally review the actual MRI diagnostic imaging films, but rather relied
upon the second-hand interpretations thereof;

•

That unlike Ors. Doerr and Verska, Dr. Friedman was not provided with, nor did he
ever personally review the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI imaging or
resultant radiological report; and

•

That Dr. Friedman completely failed to explain exactly how and when Jordan's
indistinguishable cervical symptoms as caused by the "Exacerbation of cervical spine
in 201 O," were supposedly subsumed by a previously asymptomatic degenerative
condition.

Furthennorc, given that the evidence in record establishes the occurrence of at least three (3)
MRI's, including the one perfonned on May 25, 2012, not only is Employer's insistence of
"significant fact emerging from comparison of the two MRI results" redundant, it demonstrates

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, Page 14

the incomplete nature of Dr. Friedman's resultant opinions. Respondents' I 0/10/15 Response
Brief, pg. 22.
Moreover, in proffering this tenuous "degenerative vs. acute" depiction in ad finitum,
Employer conveniently ignores a fundamental, controlling precept of Idaho law. Specifically,
eighty (80) years of legal precedent, dictates that a "traumatic aggravation" of a pre-existing
condition constitutes an injury for purposes of the Act. Nistad v. Winton Lumber Co., 59 Idaho
533, 536, 85 P.2d 236 (1938) (Aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting disease or weakened
condition is compensable if caused by the industrial accident), see also, Bowman v. Twin Falls

Const. Co., 99 Idaho 312, 581 P.2d 770 (1978). Employer concedes that Jordan experienced a
work-related traumatic event on January 12, 2010 while manually manipulating a one (1) ton
trailer dolly. Further, Dr. Doerr rendered an unambi!:,JUous causation opinion, in his capacity as
Jordan's treating surgeon, providing in pertinent part, "His 1/12/10 injury resulted in a
traumatic event with permanent aggravation of his initial preexisting injury." Hr'g Ex. E, pg.
77 ( emphasis added). Similarly, Dr. V erska opined:
[O]n a more probable-than-not basis that the 2010 injury caused him to have disc
herniations at C5-C6 and C6-C7 and aggravated the preexisting degenerative
changes at C4-C5 requiring him to have surgery at C4-C5, C5-C6, and C6-C7
by Timothy Doerr.
Hr'g Ex. F, pg. 107 (emphasis added); (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 18, LI. 12-25). Notably, even
Dr. Friedman conceded a diagnosis of "Exacerbation of cervical spine pain in 201 O," but then,
despite prior Commission admonitions, completely failed to reconcile how exactly Jordan
presented for the December 22, 2011, IME, with cervical symptoms, including right scapular
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"burning" pain, that were virtually identical to those he was exhibiting at the time Dr. Heiner
discharged him in February of 2010. Davis v. US Silver-Idaho, Inc., 2013 IIC 0048.1, 0048.3
(2013) ( on reconsideration); Hr' g Ex. 1, pg. 765 ( emphasis added).
Significantly, with respect to the interpretation of "degenerative v. acute," besides the
undisputed fact that Dr. Friedman never personally reviewed that actual diagnostic imaging,
Employer fails to account for Dr. Friedman's own concession that "It's hard to tell the

difference between an ongoing chronic problem ... and an acute injury superimposed."
(Dr. Friedman Depo, p. 17, Ll. 22

24) (emphasis added). Simply stated Employer's attempted

"degenerative vs. acute" differentiations constitute a "distinction without a difference" that do
not account for controlling law and which are not even supported by Dr. Friedman. As Dr.
Verska so aptly explained "[ A ]gain, we treat patients, not MR Is. 8 " (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 29,
LI. 20 - 21).
Contrary to the actual facts in evidence, Employer goes on to declare that Dr. Friedman
"had an opportunity to review Claimant's medical records . . . "

Respondents' 10/10/15

Response Briet: pg. 20. As set fo1ih infra, this is simply not accurate, in that Dr. Friedman
neither received nor reviewed all of the pertinent medical information in arriving at his
respective opinions.

In fact, Dr. Friedman's own records betray the fact that he did not

personally review Claimant's 2010 treatment records when he generated his December 22, 2011,
IME report. Hr' g Ex. 1, pgs. 759-60; (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 9, LI. 2-7; p. 29, LL 4

7).

Similarly, in generating the December 22, 2011, IME report, Dr. Friedman merely recited
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infonnation he extrapolated second-hand from Dr. Doe1T's treatment records. (Dr. Friedman
Depo Tr., p. 26, LI. 6

19; p. 30, LL 1-30). In addressing the fact that he actually ascribed the

wrong date to Claimant's 2010 industrial accident, Dr. Friedman testified:
A. Well, it's in Dr. Doe1T's report. He reported it to me. It's not in the records
I was sent.

*******************
A. . . . "Well it must have happened because Dr. Doerr put it in his report with a
date," so he had something I didn't have.
(Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 30, LI. 1

8) (emphasis added). Further, Dr. Friedman admitted that

he did not even perfom1 a comprehensive review of Dr. DoeIT's surgical report and could not
recall why he actually used the tenn "aggravation" in his IME report. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr.,
p. 24, Ll. 16

20; p. 30, LL 15-22). Notably, Dr. Friedman also generated his opinions premised

upon inaccurate information, including "In July of 2007, he was having constant pain in his neck
and burning in his shoulders." Hr'g Ex. l, pg. 755. During cross-examination, Dr. Friedman
acknowledged that this entry in his IME rep01i was eIToneous. (Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 28, LL
7

p. 29, LI. 3). As before, unlike Dr. Verska, and Dr. DoeIT, Dr. Friedman never personally

reviewed the actual MRI diagnostic imaging films, relying instead upon second-hand renditions,
as well as Dr. DoeJT's interpretation thereof. Again, Employer never provided Dr. Friedman
with, nor did he ever review, the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI. Thus, the indisputable
facts establish that Dr. Friedman did not review Jordan's medical records and that he was the
least infonned participant, as compared to Ors. Verska and DoeIT.

Even Dr. Friedman conceded "I don't send people to have surgeries because I see something on an X-ray study."
(Dr. Friedman Depo Tr., p. 33, LI. 13 - 14 ).

8
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Other than making the forgoing wholly unsubstantiated proclamations, at their premise,
Employer's remaining assertions appear to be little more than a laudatory na1Tation of the
Commission's April 13, 2015 Findings, Conclusions and Order, interspersed with an
aggrandized recitation of Dr. Friedman's reports and testimony. It seems axiomatic that merely
reiterating a clearly erroneous administrative decision and uninfonned, non-specialist medical
opinions do not somehow cure such insunnountable defects.

Likewise, summarily ignoring

oveffiding legal/judicial mandates, does not somehow vitiate the controlling nature of such.
ln summary, Employer failed to rebut the overwhelming factual, testimonial and medical
evidence, or the controlling legal authority in this case. Obviously, the instant appeal raises
numerous legal issues.

Moreover, it is a matter of indisputable record that the Industrial

Commission failed to identify, consider and incorporate all of Jordan's Exhibits. Further, it is
indisputable that Dr. Friedman neither received nor reviewed all of the pertinent medical
infom1ation in affiving at his respective opinions and, in some instances, proceeded under the
premise of incorrect infom1ation. Additionally, Employer did not postulate any objective facts
or legal authority that would "cure" the inherent defects of the Commission's administrative
decision or Dr. Friedman's opinions. As such, the Commission's findings and conclusions are
not premised upon substantial and competent evidence, nor do they comport with controlling
legal authority, thereby rendering them clearly erroneous. Thus, the Commission's Order "must
be set aside."

Therefore, the Commission's Order should be remanded for proceedings

accordingly.
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B.

The Industrial Commission Seemingly Applied the Incorrect Burden of
Proof.

The "Foust" presumption presumably applies to the uncontested January 12, 2010, workrelated accident and injuries. The Collli has been unequivocal in ruling that "when reviewing the
decision of the Commission, this Corni is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments' that
were presented to the Commission below ... Consequently, we 'will not consider arguments
raised for the first time on appeal."' Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 Idaho 309, 315,
336 P.3d 242 (2014) (quotations original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As in this case,
the Court has had occasion to reaffirm that when a surety fails to raise an argument before the
Commission, "It is well established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be
heard." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 (1989) ( citations omitted)

(emphasis added). "When reviewing questions of law, this Court exercises free review and may
substitute its view for the Commission's view." Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859,
934 P.2d 28 (1997). Employer failed to present any viable "burden of proof' or resolution of
"doubt" asse1iions in accord with controlling law, and is otherwise precluded from making such
argument as part of this appeal.
In what can only be described as an invitation for the Comi to "engage in a semantic
distinction analysis 9" as a means to ignore controlling legal precepts, Employer initially
acknowledges the indisputable fact that Jordan raised the issue of the applicable burden of proof
and cited commensurate legal authority in suppo1i thereof in his Opening Brief to the Court.

9

Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho at 336.
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Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 26-27. For appellate purposes, Jordan also raised the
same issues supp01ied by legal authority in the underlying administrative proceedings, which
Referee Marsters and the Commission summarily ignored. Clmt's 12/19/15 Post-Hr' g Opening
Brief, pgs. 12-13. Incontrovertibly, throughout the Commission's administrative proceedings,
Employer completely failed to present any arguments or controlling authority addressing the
"Foust" presumption. As such, in accord with controlling law, any protestations that Employer

purports to offer on the issue of the "Foust" presumption in its appellate Response Brief are
seemingly academic and otherwise barred from consideration.

Thus, as a matter of waiver,

Employer ostensibly concedes that the Commission applied the incorrect burden of proof in this
case as it relates to the January 12, 2010, industrial accident and injuries.
Even assuming, argucndo, that waiver does not apply, Employer's assertions arc
seemingly unsupported by any controlling legal authority specifically addressing the "Foust"
presumption, but rather, as in other instances, are apparently premised upon Employer's
continuous effort to ignore controlling legal edicts applicable to workers' compensation cases.
Initially, Employer attempts, without any supporting legal authority, to artificially limit the
"Foust" presumption by asserting that it only applies as to whether "an accident and injury

occmTing on the employer's premises is compensable under the Worker's Compensation law."
Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 26-27 (underline original). In attempting to derive
some semblance of distinction, Employer declares "However, the compensability issues were
never in doubt here." Id. at pg 27 (emphasis added). It appears that Employer is equating
and/or confusing the "Foust" presumption, with "the two-pronged test for detennining
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compensability." Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho at 859. Regardless, this asse1iion defies
the reality that this entire cause of action both before the Commission and this Comi is centered
around the compensability of Jordan's neck conditions necessitating the June 6, 2012, C4-7
cervical decompression and fusion as specifically related to the January 12, 2010, accident that
occmTed on the Employer's premises. Despite this reality, Employer asserts, again without legal
citation, "This Court has never held that Defendants have the burden of proving the negative on
the issue of medical causation

that an accident did not cause the need for the requested

treatment." Id. This rationalization directly contradicts the fundamental legal premises of the
"Foust" presumption and parallel controlling legal authority.
Specifically, the Comi recently reaffinned:
When an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a presumption arises that the
injury arose out of the claimant's employment. Foust v. Birds },'ye Div. of Gen.
Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418,419,422 P.2d 616,617 (1967). Once a claimant
establishes that he suffered an injury on his employer's premises, the employer
then bears "the burden of producing evidence" to show that the claimant's "injury
did not arise out of or in the course of employment." Kessler v. Payette County,
129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P .2d 28, 32 ( 1997). If the employer meets its burden, the
employee, "without the benefit of the statutory presumption ... , has the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the facts essential to recovery."
Evans v. Hara's Inc., 123 Idaho 473,479, 849 P.2d 934, 940 (1993).
Vawter v. UPS, 155 Idaho 903,318 P.3d 893,898 (2014) (quotations original). Notably, the
Court's unequivocal command that "the employer then bears 'the burden of producing
evidence' to show that the claimant's "injury did not arise out of or in the course of
employment" clearly routs Employer's nebulous "proving the negative" protestations. In fact, in
addressing another statutory presumption, the Comi detennined "It was not sufficient that the
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employer merely presented negative evidence tending to rule out other causes . . . negative
evidence alone will not defeat the statutory presumption ... " Evans v. Hara's Inc., 123 Idaho
473, 478-79, 849 P.2d 934 (1993).
In accord with Vawter, given that it is "undisputed 10" Jordan's January 12, 2010, activity
of manually moving a one ( 1) ton dolly on the Employer's premises constituted an accident
causing injury, the Commission was seemingly compelled to require Employer "to come forward
with proof sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the [injury] is not one arising
out of and in the course of employment." If applicable, the Commission's failure to impose the
requisite reversed burden of proof further implicates Jordan's due process rights. At best, it
could be argued that Employer's presentation of Dr. Friedman's incomplete, uninformed
opinions overcame the "Foust" presumption, wherein Claimant then subsequently rebutted with
the medical evidence and opinions of Drs. Foutz, Verska and Doen-, which currently stand
uncontested, thereby establishing compensability to a reasonable degree of medical probability.
Employer references "Gomez, supra and Walters, supra" in support of the general
premise that an injured worker seeking additional medical benefits still bears the burden of
proving the medical nexus. Respondents' I 0/10/15 Response Brief, pg. 27. From the onset, this
proposition once again ignores the legal reality that the "Foust" presumption constitutes a
distinct exception to the standard burden of proof. Moreover, Gomez and Waters are inapposite,
as the "Foust" presumption was neither raised nor argued in either case.

Gomez primarily

addressed the premise that a claim for fmiher medical benefits invokes the issue of causation,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, Page 22

"because causation is at the root of all workers' compensation cases." Gomez v. Dura Mark,
Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 603, 272 P.3d 569 (2012).

Significantly, the Corni's detennination in

Gomez that an Employer's partial payment for some medical benefits docs not statutorily, or

otherwise

"presume"

causation,

directly

contravenes

Employer's

assertions

that

"compcnsability" in Jordan's case is not disputed because Employer payed for some of the
medical care. Moreover, Waters is disparate given that the need for surgery was undisputed and
the sole contested issue was pemrnnent partial disability in the context of a refusal to provide
records documenting subsequent intervening events. See generally, Waters v. All Phase Const.,
156 Idaho 259, 322 P.3d 992 (2014).

However, one interesting aspect of Waters was the

Commission's rejection of an expert witness's opinions because he was not provided with all of
the relevant medical records. As previously addressed, this same circumstance is present in the
instant action, given that it is indisputable Employer failed to provide Dr. Friedman with all of
the relevant medical records in this case, including, but not limited to, Jordan's 2010 treatment
records as well as the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI. Hr'g Ex. E, pg. 78.
Finally, in perpetuating its pervasive position that controlling law should be arbitrarily
ignored in this case, Employer nebulously takes umbrage with Jordan's direct cite to the Corni's
decision in Page, therein setting fo1ih "Case law holds that doubts about an injury arising out of
and in the course of employment are resolved in favor of the claimant." Page v. McCain Foods,
Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 348, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005) (citation omitted).

The Court's judicial

precedent is replete with this long-standing mandate reflecting the "humane," "remedial" and

10

"Undisputed. It is undisputed that Claimant suffered workplace accidents on May 16, 2006 and January 12, 2010,
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I

"liberal constrnction" premises of the Act. Vawter v. UPS, 155 Idaho 903,318 P.3d 893,898
(2014) ("If there is doubt surrounding whether the accident in question arose out of and in the
course of employment, the matter will be resolved in favor of the worker."); Spivey v. Novartis
Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788 (2002) ("If there is doubt surrounding whether the

I

accident in question arose out of and in the course of employment, the matter will be resolved in
favor of the worker."); Dinius v. Loving Care & More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 900 P.2d 738
(1999) ("Where there is some doubt whether the accident in question arose out of and in the
course of employment, the matter will be resolved in favor of the worker."); Haldiman v.

I

American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 957, 793 P.2d 187 (1990) ('doubtful cases should be

resolved in favor of compensation'); Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572
(1989) ("Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured.");

Kiger v. Idaho C0171., 85 Idaho 424, 432, 380 P.2d 208 (1963) ('doubtful cases should be
resolved in favor of compensation'); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 26, 170 P.2d

I

404 (1946) ('doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation'); Hansen v. Superior
Prod. Co., 65 Idaho 457, 458, 146 P.2d 335 (1944) ("Doubts whether accident arose out of and

in course of employment will be resolved in favor of workman."). As such, Employer's apparent
subjective distain for over seventy (70) years of controlling judicial precedent 11 does not

I

somehow render such inapplicable. Thus, as with all injured workers under the Act, Jordan is

while working for Meadow Gold, that resulted in injuries to his neck." R., pg. 2 (italics original).
11 "For almost seventy years this Court has adhered to the principle that the worker's compensation law should be
liberally construed in favor of the claimant in order to effect the object of the law and promote justice. Haldiman v.
American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho at 956 (citations omitted).

I
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entitled to the benefit of any doubt in relation to the injuries arising from the January 12, 2010,
uncontested work-related accident.
The "Foust" presumption ostensibly applies to the subject January I 0, 2012, industrial
accident and injuries.

Moreover, Employer is precluded from addressing the "Foust"

presumption and effectively concedes that the Commission applied the incorrect burden of proof
in this case.

Fmiher, in accord with over seventy (70) years of controlling authority, Jordan is

entitled to the benefit of doubt in relation to the injuries arising from the January 12, 2010,
uncontested work-related accident. Therefore, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the
opinions and records of Dr. Foutz, Verska and Doerr, stand unrebutted, thereby establishing
compensability of Jordan's January 12, 2010, neck injuries necessitating the June 6, 2012, C4-7
cervical decompression and fusion.
C.

Referee Marsters' Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
arc of "Consequence."

Referee Marsters' March 18, 2015, Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are "consequential" to the Court and Jordan. It is "incumbent upon the Commission to
include the recommended decision in the record and to at least briefly explain why it was
discarded." Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supp{v Inc., 2015 Opinion No. 102, *9 (2015) (J.
Jones, J., specially concurring). "This is paiiicularly critical where there may be some difference
between the facts found by the referee and those made by the Commission." Id. at *9 (J. Jones,

J., specially concurring). Employer's assertions disregard not only controlling judicial authority,
but also the necessity of disclosing the underlying administrative practices at issue in this case.
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As

1s

endemic

throughout,

Employer's

declaration

that

Referee

Marsters'

Recommendations and Conclusions "is really of no consequence" because the administrative
decision would come out against Jordan regardless, directly contravenes the Court's unequivocal
directives.

Respondents' 10/10/15 Response Brief, pgs. 27 and 28.

Significantly, the Court

recently instructed that for purposes of assessing the Commission's "administrative practice," it
must now "ensure that a referee's recommended decision is always included as paii of the record
on appeal ... Otherwise, this Comi does not have a complete picture of the case upon which
to base an infonned decision on appeal." Kelly, 2015 Opinion No. 102, *9 (J. Jones, J., specially

concurring) (emphasis added).

Employer's asse1iions would also serve also circumvent

disclosure of the "administrative practices" at issue in this case.
Specifically, despite the Court's explicit admonition that "simply rnbberstamping .
obvious e1Tors or inappropriate conclusions does not fulfill" the Commission's responsibilities,
in this instance, the Commission indiscriminately adopted and incorporated Referee Marsters'
e1Toneous and unsubstantiated "Findings of Fact" and inexplicable exclusion of Jordan's
Exhibits, through its April 13, 2015, Decision and Order. Clark v. Shari's Management C01p.,
314 P.3d at 639 (J. Jones, J., specially concurring). Such "rubberstamping" is revealed by the
fact that the Commission, verbatim, adopted Paragraph 36 of Referee Marsters' "Findings of
Fact," which, as addressed in Jordan's Opening Brief, referenced testimony attributed to Jordan
that does not exist.

R., pg. 16; Referee's 3/18/15 Findings & Recommendations, pg. 16.

Similarly, the Commission also adopted Paragraph 37 of Referee Marsters' "Findings of Fact"
which, as covered in Jordan's Opening Brief, relies upon a "telephone message from July 26,
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2011" that is not contained in evidence.

Id.

Further, in arbitrarily incorporating Referee

Marsters' capricious dismissal of Dr. Foutz's testimonial clarification/explanation as contained
in Paragraph 37, the Commission also adopted the Referee's implicit bias in disregarding the
Court's "substantial evidence" strictures as set forth in Stevens-McAtee. Stevens-McAtee v.
Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325,336, 179 P.3d 288 (2008) 12 •

As addressed infra, the pervasive extent of the "rubberstamping" is revealed by the fact
that the Commission even copied the Referee's incomplete designation of Jordan's hearing
Exhibits as actually entered into evidence.
Recommendations, pg. 4.

R., pg. 4; Referee's 3/18/15 Findings &

As before, in failing to independently identify, consider and

incorporate all of Jordan's hearing Exhibits, the Commission also fostered the Referee's
demonstrable bias against Jordan. It seems fundamental and manifest that such "administrative
practices" defeat the "humane" purposes of the Act.
Referee Marsters' and the Commission's "administrative practices" are at issue in this
case. The Commission verbatim "rubberstamped" Referee Marsters' reference and reliance upon
non-existent testimony and an exhibit that does not exist in evidence. Further, the Commission
sanctioned Referee Marsters' unmitigated disregard for "substantial evidence" strictures imposed
by the Court.

Moreover, the Commission "rubberstamped" Referee Marsters' improper and

incomplete identification of Jordan's hearing Exhibits.

As such, without Referee Marsters'

March 18, 2015, Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court will "not

I

12

"In light of[the treating doctor's] statements at deposition qualifying the medical forms which originated from his
office, the evidence contained in those forms cannot be considered to be substantial evidence contradicting [the
injured worker's] presentation of medical evidence."
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have a complete picture of the case upon which to base an infonned decision on appeal." Thus,
Employer's contention that Referee Marsters' Recommendations and Conclusions "is really of
no consequence" derogates controlling law.

Therefore, Referee Marsters' March 18, 2015,

Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are "consequential" as a matter of law,
as well as for purposes of disclosing the administrative practices at play in this case.

D.

The Industrial Commission Erred in Determining that All Remaining Issues
Were Moot.

Employer concedes that in the event of reversal, the remaining issues must be addressed.
Therefore, the Comi should order remand of all remaining issues for impmiial deliberation upon
the recorded facts in accord with controlling law.
E.

Jordan Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs.

Jordan is entitled to an award of attorney fees.

Attorney fees may be recovered for

unreasonable denial of benefits. Specifically, the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act provides in
relevant part:

Attorney's fees - Punitive costs in certain cases. - If the commission or any court
before whom any proceedings are brought under this law dctennines that the
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured
employee ... without reasonable ground, or his surety neglected or refused within
a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the
injured employee ... the compensation provided by law ... In all such cases, the
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees . . . shall be fixed by the
comm1ss1on.
See, I,C. § 72-804 ( emphasis original) ( emphasis added). Given the unrebutted facts in evidence

and controlling legal authority in this instant action, Employer's "denial" of Jordan's claim was
entirely unreasonable.
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From a fundamental perspective, Jordan's worker's compensation claim is relatively
straight-forward. Specifically, Jordan experienced industrial accidents in 2006 and 2010 while
working for the same Employer, which resulted in injuries that were accepted and partially
covered by two (2) distinct Sureties. Upon release from the 2006 work-related accident, Jordan
only experienced negligible symptoms that always resolved. In January of 2007, Jordan received
treatment for a work-related ankle injury, without any corresponding neck, cervical, or am1
symptoms. However, following the January 12, 2010, accepted injury(ies), involving manually
pushing a one-ton trailer dolly by himself, Jordan was released from medical care premised upon
an en-oneous assessment that his symptoms "did not indicate any significant pathology and
should resolve gradually over time." During the interim, this prognosis proved to be wholly
inaccurate as Jordan continued to experience cervical related symptoms.

Jordan's interim

struggle with unrelenting cervical symptoms was con-oborated by his Board Certified family
physician, Dr. Foutz. Subsequently, upon receiving all of the relevant medical records, Jordan's
treating, Board Certified orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Doen, authored an opinion to the Surety
covering the 2006 injury, setting forth in pertinent part, "His O1/12/10 injury resulted in a
traumatic event with pennanent aggravation of his initial preexisting injury" and recommended
cervical surgical intervention.
Unfortunately, the record demonstrates that rather than lend credence to Dr. Doen's wellfounded, expert opinions, the two (2) Sureties, with arguably conflicting interests, pooled
resources and implemented a fonnulaic "preexisting degenerative disease" strategy as a means to
devise a "medical" basis to absolve them both of liability, while simultaneously serving to
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completely deny Jordan the medical treatment he needed to address the cervical injuries arising
from the January 12, 2010, accepted accident. To that end, the Sureties hired a physiatrist, with
no orthopedic cervical surgical expe1iise whatsoever, to address the need for specialized cervical
surgical intervention, and to critique the opinions as well as recommendations of Jordan's Board
Cc1iified treating orthopedic surgeon.
Specifically, the record is indisputable in establishing that in portending to obtain an
"independent medical opinion" from Dr. Friedman through his December 22, 2011, IME repo1i,
Employer completely failed to provide or otherwise withheld Claimant's 2010 treatment records,
thereby guaranteeing a predctennincd outcome. Furthennore, despite full knowledge of its
existence, Employer also withheld the third pre-operative May 25, 2012, MRI from Dr.
Friedman's consideration, as apparent means to perpetuate his initial unsubstantiated causation
op11110ns.
In awarding attorney fees under analogous circumstances, the Commission held:
Additionally, by refusing to give medical experts all the facts ... in fom1ing his
opinion, Defendant acted unreasonably ... To taint those experts' opinions in
such a manner seriously undercuts credence which the Commission might
otherwise afford those opinions. Moreover, such tactics inevitably result in a
continuing unreasonable denial of acclaim.

Ida2003 v. Se(f-lnsured Employer, 2003 IIC 0188.1, 0188.8 (2003) (emphasis added).
Remarkably, the Commission reproved this exact "preexisting degenerative disease" strategy of
deriving an opinion premised upon omission of pertinent medical infonnation, wherein Dr.
Friedman utilized the same approach for the same Defense finn. See, Bogar v. Sodexo Inc.,
2012 IIC 0100.l, 0100.6 ("In arriving at these conclusions, Dr. Friedman apparently neither took
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nor reviewed any x-rays of Claimant's back"), see also, Davis v. US Silver, 2012 IIC 0103.1,

0103.12 (2012) ("Even so, [Dr. Friedman] did not have access to the actual films for the 2002,
2005 and 2008 MRis").

It is incontrovertible that Jordan has a right to rely upon the

Commission's consistent application of the law. Medrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 769-70,
40 P.3d 125 (2002).
The overarching irony in this scenario is that the even absent cervical surgical expertise,
Dr. Friedman opined that the fusion surgery perfonned by Dr. DoeIT was "medically
appropriate" and "reasonable" with a good outcome, but, in his assessment, was perfonned
premised upon the wrong diagnosis.

(Dr. Friedman Dcpo Tr., p. 35, LI. 4

10).

The

incongruous and result oriented nature of such a proposition is self-evident and presents as
"armchair doctoring," serving only to "second guess" the treatment requirements of a Surgeon
who had the incomparable opportunity to actually visualize and treated the affected area through
the invasive June 6, 2012, procedure.
In summary, given Employer's formulaic and fabricated basis for denying Jordan
necessary medical treatment, including cervical surgery, attorney fees should be awarded to the
full extent allowed by Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. Therefore, the Court should award
attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all stages of Jordan's claim, including those below, on
appeal and any on remand.
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III.

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing argument and authority, Jordan respectfully requests
that the Court: reverse the Commission's findings that "Claimant's testimony concerning the
history and cause of his symptoms following the 2006 and 2010 accidents lacks substantive
credibility;" reverse the Commission's conclusion that Jordan "failed to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that his 2012 cervical spine surgery was necessitated, in whole or in
part, by either the 2006 or 2010 industrial accidents;" reverse the Commission's conclusion that
"All other issues are moot;" and award attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all stages of
Jordan's claim, including those below, on appeal and any on remand; and remand for
proceedings consistent therewith.

~

DA TED this _/__ day of December, 2015.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
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